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The Longer-Term Effects of
Management-Led Buy-Outs
Mike Wright
Nick Wilson
Ken Robbie

There is now extensive evidence on short-term performance improvements in buy-outs,
but little relating to the longer-term. This paper examines the relatively neglected area
of the longevity and longer-term effects of smaller buy-outs. In terms o f longevity, the
evidence presented shows that the majority remain as independent buy-outs for at least
eight years after the transaction, and that entrepreneurial actions concerning both
restructuring and product innovation are important parts of entrepreneurs’ strategies
over a ten year period or more. For the first time, the paper also provides an analysis of
the financial performance and productivity of a large sample of buy-outs and non-buy
outs. It shows that on a variety of financial ratios buy-outs significantly outperform a
matched sample o f non-buy-outs, especially from year 3 onwards. Analysis of post buy
out efficiency o f survivor buy-outs, using regression analysis to estimate augmented
Cobb-Douglas production functions, shows that buy-outs are superior to matched non
buy-outs with a productivity differential of the order of 9% on average from year t+2
onwards. The evidence of superior longer term performance suggests that venture cap
italists may need to consider their investment perspectives carefully, particularly in
respect of exit versus second round investment. For financiers it is clear that the buy-out
concept can be successfully applied to growth as well as restructuring cases.

I. INTRODUCTION
Management buy-outs have emerged as a significant organizational form over the
last decade and a half. It is well-known that the structuring of a buy-out involves
the introduction of significant equity incentives for the entrepreneurs involved,
together with monitoring systems by venture capitalists and other funds providers
(Jensen, 1993; Wright, Robbie, Thompson, & Starkey, 1994). Examination of the
characteristics of the leading individuals in buy-outs and buy-ins shows that they
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display similar characteristics to those of entrepreneurs generally (Robbie &
Wright, 1996) and that they undertake significant entrepreneurial actions in terms
of both restructuring and innovation (Wright,Thompson, & Robbie, 1992; Zahra,
1995).
Buy-outs play a significant role in the activities of venture capitalists, espe
cially in mature markets (Ooghe, et al., 1991). In the UK, for example, buy-outs
accounted for 18 percent of the number of investments by the industry in 1994 and
67 percent of total value (BVCA, 1995). This importance raises issues concerning
whether the gains which may accrue are sustainable. Dutch analysis shows that
early stage finance was on average loss-making (-3 percent annual return) com
pared with the much less riskier management buy-outs which earned a high posi
tive return of 25 percent per year. Analysis of returns in the UK for a sample of
funds launched between 1980 and 1990 show that large MBO funds produced the
highest internal rates of return at 23.1 percent and early stage 4 percent (BVCA,
1996). It is not clear from these studies, however, whether high internal rates of
return are earned from a series of short-term investments or are the result of long
term performance.
The expectation of longer term benefits from buy-outs is the subject of some
debate. Jensen (1993) argues that buy-outs represent a new long term form of orga
nization whose incentive and monitoring properties may be expected to produce
superior performance in enterprises having undertaken such a transaction than
prior to the buy-out. Moreover, benefits may also accrue where entrepreneiurs with
majority stakes have a longer-term conunitment to the enterprise. However, in
contrast, it may be the case that the major benefits to be derived from restructuring
and cost reduction are short-lived and that venture capitahsts seeking to earn high
internal rates of return on their investments place pressure on management to exit
in a relatively short period.
The aims of this study are to examine the longevity of venture-backed versus
non-venture-backed smaller buy-outs, strategic reorganization following buy-out
and whether buy-outs display superior longer term financial performance and effi
ciency to non-buy-outs. The particular emphasis is upon smaller management-led
buy-outs where incumbents typically hold a majority or a significant share of the
equity. The evidence presented in the results section of this article shows that even
ten years after the transaction approaching half of companies remain as buy-outs,
although venture-backed buy-outs exit at a considerably greater rate than non-ven
ture backed deals. Over this ten year period, buy-outs which remain as such are
found to experience extensive changes to their senior management teams and to
engage in extensive strategic entrepreneurial actions (such as new product devel
opment) as well as cost restructuring. The results of the analysis of longer term
performance using financial data show that on a variety of financial ratios (such as
return on assets and return on equity) buy-outs significantly outperform a matched
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sample of non-buy-outs, especially from year 3 onwards. In addition, analysis of
post buy-out efficiency shows that buy-outs are superior to matched non-buy-outs
with a productivity differential of the order of 9% on average from the second year
after buy-out onwards.
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews existing literature
and suggests a number of expectations about the longer term performance effects
of buy-outs. The subsequent section outUnes the data and methodology used and is
followed by four sections detailing the results of the study. First, we trace the lon
gevity of venture backed and non-venture backed buy-outs. Second, we identify
the strategic actions taken in buy-outs which last for ten years or more. Third we
compare buy-outs and non-buy-outs in terms of their long term financial perfor
mance. Finally, we examine labor and capital productivity gains. In the final sec
tion, conclusions and implications are drawn.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Jensen (1993) provides a framework for the analysis of the expected longevity and
performance effects in buy-outs. According to Jensen, the classic buy-out structure
with increased managerial equity holding, providing an incentive to perform, and
increased monitoring through the commitment to service debt and the direct role of
active investors, provides the mechanisms for reducing agency problems associ
ated with diffuse ownership in large quoted companies. The Jensen argument sug
gests that particular types of firms may be especially suited to this classic form of
buy-out structure, notably those quoted firms in stable and mature markets with
relatively low investment needs which have been under-performing and wasting
free cash flow. Such firms may be expected in the Jensen view to continue to oper
ate as long-term forms of organization. Rappaport (1990) contests the Jensen view
suggesting that they are likely to be short-lived as investors seek returns on their
investment by selling or floating the company. It is becoming clear, however, that
Jensen’s argument rests on a highly restricted sub-set of what is a more generic
concept. While buy-outs which meet Jensen’s criteria may indeed last a long time,
the wider applicability of the buy-out concept due to the use of varying financial
instruments, funding structures and managerial involvement suggests that the lon
gevity of buy-outs is likely to be heterogeneous (Wright, et al., 1994). While
extensive evidence is now available relating to larger buy-outs, especially those
which involve highly leveraged going-privates of listed companies, little is avail
able on their longer-term effects in terms of strategies, performance, control sys
tems, etc. Moreover, smaller transactions where management have substantial
equity stakes and which form the majority of buy-out transactions in most markets
have received little attention. These cases may be wholly funded by clearing bank
debt or with a mixture of debt and equity provided by venture capitalists. This
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important role of venture capitalists has tended to be underplayed because of the
general focus upon highly leveraged transactions and because, especially in the
US, venture capital firms are not typically associated with buy-outs.
Longevity
Existing evidence suggests that although some buy-outs may float on a stock
market or be sold within a very short period of time, the majority may remain as
buy-outs for well in excess of seven years (see e.g., Kaplan, 1991 for the US;
Wright, Thompson, Robbie, & Wong, 1995 for the UK; Wright, Robbie, Romanet,
Thompson, Joachimsson, Bruining, & Herst, 1993 for France, Sweden and Hol
land), with smaller buy-outs being significantly more likely than large ones to
remain as buy-outs for long periods. This heterogeneity may be expected to be
influenced by the objectives of the main parties to the transaction-funding institu
tions (especially venture capitalists and banks and incumbent management
(Wright, et al., 1994).
Both venture capitalists and clearing banks play a significant role in the fund
ing of buy-outs (see Table 2 below). Venture capitalists’ and other funding institu
tions’ perspectives will be important because of their need to earn sufficiently high
rates of return to satisfy their funds’ providers. There is evidence that investment
horizons vary between types of venture capitalist (Wright & Robbie, 1996), with
independent venture capitalists typically being more constrained to exit sooner
than are those captive firms funded by parent banks or pension funds. Venture cap
italists’ desires for exit are also more clearly specified than is the case for banks
where long-term relationships may be important (Holland, 1994).
Hence it is expected that venture-backed buy-outs are more likely to exit
sooner and at a greater rate than non-venture backed buy-outs, but also that the
majority of buy-outs and especially those where management have majority con
trol will continue to exist as such for long periods. Where exit does not take place
through flotation or trade sale, financiers may seek to obtain a return through the
liquidation of at least some of their investment through redemption or repurchase
by the investee company. Hence, it may be expected that buy-outs which remain
as independent private (unUsted) firms for long periods will demonstrate extensive
buying back of preference stock and/or the buy-back of ordinary stock.
The influence of managers may be particularly important where the initiative
for a buy-out is taken by management who perceive an entrepreneurial opportunity
(Wright, et al., 1992). The extent to which managers may wish to continue to pur
sue an entrepreneurial career rather than exiting through becoming managerial
employees again or through retirement, also impacts on longevity. Differences in
the motivations of buy-out managers may be an important element in this decision.
Over a long period of time, it may be expected that retirement and other factors
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will lead to extensive changes in the executive and non-executive board members
in bought-out companies.
There is evidence that managers engage in extensive changes to control sys
tems after buy-out as well as organizational restructuring and various efforts to
enhance their trading activity (Jones, 1992; Wright, et al., 1992). Buy-outs where
management fail to make adequate restructuring close to buy-out to create a viable
entity at the time of the buy-out appear more likely to fail. An analysis of financial
and non-financial variables (Wright, Wilson, Robbie, & Ennew, 1996) shows that
initial and start-up characteristics of MB Os, reflected in a number of key nonfmancial variables demonstrate a strong ability to explain failure up to five years
later. Greater levels of restructuring undertaken expeditiously at buy-out are asso
ciated with survival while the need to deal with problems some time after buy-out
are associated with failure. Factors measuring the initial motivations for manage
ment undertaking the buy-out relating to desires to control one’s own business,
develop one’s own talents, long term faith in the company and to achieve financial
rewards (positive motives) were found to have a significant and negative sign indi
cating that such motivations reduce the probability of subsequent failure. Buy-outs
which raise funds from the wider body of employees have a lower probability of
failure which supports the strength of the incentive-motivation hypothesis over the
pure risk spreading hypothesis. Liquidity has a significant and negative impact on
the probability of failure and is consistent with highly leveraged firms facing dif
ficulty in servicing debt commitments. Small and large buy-outs were also found
to be more prone to failure with the medium-sized exhibiting a lower failure prob
ability. High gearing was found to be associated with a higher probability of fail
ure. Turnover per employee, an activity/efficiency ratio, was negatively associated
with the profitability of failure. In an agency theory context, these findings are
consistent with the control function of high levels of debt which place pressure on
management to restructure. There has, however, been little attention to the strate
gic actions taken by management over the longer-term in terms of comparisons of
perceptions of the relative importance of factors at the time of the buy-out and in
the long-term (in excess of ten years), or of the relative importance of differing
kinds of external and internal influences on profitability which may be within the
control of management.
Strategic Reorganization
An examination of large US buy-outs provides evidence of post-buy-out res
toration of strategic focus, with almost half of buy-outs engaging in significant
refocusing including divestment of assets (Seth and Easterwood, 1993), although
it is not clear to what extent these changes occur over the long-or short-term. US
evidence also generally shows buy-out firms fail to expand their employment in
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line with industry averages and that capital investment falls following the buy-out
(see Palepu, 1990 and Thompson & Wright, 1995, for reviews). Long and Ravenscraft (1993), however, show that those buy-outs which are R&D intensive are not
disadvantaged. The evidence on UK MBOs is rather different. For the UK, Wright,
et al. (1992) report that asset sales are offset by new capital investment, particu
larly in plant and equipment.
Much of the work relating to buy-outs has focused on the benefits from
restrucmring, with there being a view that such benefits are effectively once-forall. After these cost reductions have been obtained, classic highly leveraged buy
outs in mature sectors with low investment opportunities may have little prospect
of further significant performance improvement. However, it is clear that the buy
out concept is not confined to such tightly restricted circumstances.
In two of the few studies to cover short term changes in smaller buy-outs, Mal
one (1989) in a US study and Wright and Coyne (1985) and Wright, et.al. (1992)
for the UK show significant increases in new product development occur post buy
out which the entrepreneurs concerned consider would not otherwise have hap
pened. (See also Bull, 1989 for the US). Zahra (1995) shows for a sample of 47 US
buy-outs where management had contributed a significant share of the purchase
price, substantial increases in product development, technological alliances, R&D
staff size and capabilities and new business creation activities. These corporate
entrepreneurship factors were significantly and positively associated with changes
in company performance. Little is known, however, about the extent and nature of
strategic actions in buy-outs which last for periods of ten years or more and in par
ticular the relative importance attached to product innovation, market-related fac
tors and cost reductions.
If cost reductions are once-for-all, extensive product and market-related inno
vation may be expected if the company is to succeed over a long period. Alterna
tively, long-lasting buy-outs may undertake initial restructuring actions and
actions to enhance control systems which enables them to maintain a stable posi
tion over a long period. A priori, it is not clear which case will prevail since both
may be consistent with the enhanced incentive and control mechanisms found in
buy-outs. In order to obtain insights on these aspects we surveyed the strategic
actions of a sample of long lasting buy-outs as well as longer term financial perfor
mance (see below).
Financial Performance
Most available studies concerning post buy-out financial performance changes
have concerned the first two to three years after the transaction. Research on US
LB Os indicates substantial mean improvements in profitability, cash flow and pro
ductivity measures over the interval between one year prior to the transaction and
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two or three years subsequent to it. A series of studies of early 1980s LBOs (see
Palepu, 1990; Jensen, 1993; Thompson & Wright, 1995 for reviews) reports mean
gains in the operating cash flow/sales ratio of between 11.9 and 55% and also
major increases in productivity. A subsequent study (Opler, 1992) using deals
completed in the later 1980s reports a 16.5% gain in that ratio over a similar three
year period. A survey of 182 mid-1980s MBOs in the UK indicated that 6 8 %
showed clear improvements in profitability, compared with 17% that showed a
clear profitability fall (Wright, et al., 1992). In this study and the American work
cited above, improvements in working capital management, particularly credit
management, and productivity, appear to be an important identified source of
improved performance.
Performance improvements are reported to be more significant in divisional
buy-outs which subsequently come to market as opposed to buyouts of firms
which were previously quoted (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990).
Muscarella and Vetsuypens show that the gains in performance are mainly the
result of cost reductions rather than revenue generation or improved asset turnover.
In contrast, Singh finds that buy-outs coming to market had revenue growth, as
well as accounts receivable and stock control, above their industry averages. How
ever, it is possible that such comparisons are biased upwards because only the
more successful buy-outs are compared to industry averages. In the UK, studies
have found superior company performance relative to the market in buy-outs
which come to market both before and after the IPO (Wright & Robbie, 1995).
In an attempt to isolate the factors influencing changes in post buy-out perfor
mance, Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992) find using UK data that the size of
entrepreneurs’ equity stakes is strongly significant, whereas investor control vari
ables have relatively little influence. Green (1992) reports that over and above any
(financial) incentive on the buy-out team to become better managers, ownership
was interpreted as allowing them to perform their tasks more effectively. Owner
ship was perceived more as an outcome than as a cause of innovative behavior and
was also associated with owner-managers becoming more careful and critical in
their analysis of innovative projects. Debt-control was reported to restrict certain
diversifying and acquisition strategies, at least until leverage was reduced, and to
encourage cost reduction.
Phan and Hill (1995) in a study of large US going-private buy-outs, show that
management equity holdings as well as debt are positively associated with
improved performance post buy-out, but that the former has a greater impact than
the latter. In one of the few studies to examine performance changes over differing
periods, they find a positive association between managerial equity and perfor
mance over one, three and five year periods after buy-out but that this relationship
in respect of debt and performance does not hold for the longer period.
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Efficiency Changes
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) use a Cobb-Douglas analysis to examine pro
ductivity changes in buy-outs for a period of eight years prior to the transaction
and for up to five years afterwards. Using plant level data they find that productiv
ity is significantly greater for the first three years post buy-out than for any of the
years pre-buy-out, though buy-out plants were already more efficient than non
buy-out ones. For years four and five, the differences are not significant, which is
found to be due to differences in the productivity effects of early and late buy-outs
rather than the transitory nature of any gains.
Parallel to efficiency studies of buy-outs is a growing body of evidence relat
ing to wider employee ownership (see e.g. Wilson, 1992 for a review). Conte and
Svejnar (1987) and Jones and Kato (1995) examine factor productivity using
Cobb-Douglas production function analysis in US and Japanese firms, respec
tively, by comparing firms which have extensive employee ownership and those
where it is absent. Both studies find significant and positive effects on a value
added measure of productivity from wider share ownership whether it is in the
form of a co-operative (Conte & Svejnar) or an ESOP (Jones & Kato), although the
effect declines over time. However, neither of these studies examined cases where
employee ownership was introduced through a form of buy-out.
Given that buy-outs involve not only direct equity ownership by incumbents
but also monitoring by active investors and commitments to servicing extemal
funding, it may be expected that they will display superior financial performance,
especially profitability and labor and capital productivity than non-buy-outs, after
controlling for firm and industry characteristics. The remaining sections of this
paper provide evidence relating to these issues.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The primary data source for the detailed analysis presented in this article is the
database of UK buy-outs compiled by the authors. This Centre for Management
Buy-Out Research (CMBOR) dataset has been compiled on a continuing basis
since 1980. Data are collected from several sources. The primary source is a twiceyearly survey of all known venture capitalists, banks and intermediaries involved
in the negotiation and completion of buy-out transactions. The respondents receive
in return a free copy of a definitive quarterly review of the buy-out market, which
contributes to the survey yielding a near 100 percent response rate. The survey of
institutions is supplemented by Textline searches of national, local and regional
press, searches of company accounts and Extel cards for announcements of divest
ments to management, and searches of the specialist business press. This process
produces what is effectively a listing of the population of UK buy-outs. The
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Table 1
Development of Buy-outs and Buy-ins in the UK
(Values and Numbers of Deals)

Source:

Year

Values (£m)

Numbers

1980-86
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

4,359
3,521
4,931
7,506
3,108
2,838
3,261
2,860
3,675
5,006

1,580
434
489
523
597
567
586
485
548
542

CMBOR

dataset reveals that the UK buyout market is one of the largest in the world with
around 500 deals per year completed over the past decade (Table 1).
Two samples were generated from the overall CMBOR database. The first
involved a representative sample of 158 buyouts completed in 1983-85 and sur
veyed in mid-1986 and which had been tracked up to end 1995 or receivership.
This data set was used to monitor in detail the timing and nature of exit from a buy
out (trade sale/flotation or receivership) for both buy-outs which were venturebacked and those which were not. The second sample had considerable overlap
with the timing of the first and was used to analyze the longer term performance of
buy-outs. This sample involved 251 buy-outs contained on the CMBOR database
completed in the period 1982-84, essentially the beginning of the UK buy-out mar
ket, for which accounting and financial data could be obtained and is used to ana
lyze the longer term performance and efficiency of buy-outs.
The questionnaire to be administered to the first sample was developed follow
ing a survey of the literature and discussions with practitioners and was piloted
with practitioners and a small number of buy-outs. A copy of the full data-capture
instrument is available on request from the authors. This sample was obtained by
mailing questionnaires to all buy-outs identified by the authors as having been
completed in this period. A response rate of 35 percent was achieved to produce
the 158 companies in the final sample. On the basis of demographic data (source
of buy-out, geographical region, etc.) chi-squared tests revealed no significant dif
ferences between the distributions of these variables in the sample and in the buy
out population generally as kept on the main CMBOR database. The buy-outs in
this sample which had not exited by mid-1996, were surveyed again ten years after
the initial survey, using a mail questionnaire developed and piloted as for the pre
vious one and with a reminder questionnaire also being sent. This survey yielded
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complete responses of buy-outs out of the 71 of the original sample which had
not exited by the time of the survey in June 1996 (see Tables 3 and 4 plus those
buy-outs which the authors were able to identify as having exited after ten years).
This represents a positive response rate of 49.3 percent, which may be considered
quite high for a mail questionnaire survey and very encouraging indeed for a sam
ple revisited ten years on. The results from this second survey enabled questions
relating to longer term strategic factors and changes in management to be exam
ined.
For the companies in the second sample, accounting data relating to financial
performance, such as profitability, liquidity, leverage and employee productivity
were collected. These variables constitute the prime indicators of the main dimen
sions of the financial performance of a company. In the UK, publicly available
databases enable such data to be obtained quite readily since companies which are
not listed on a stock market are required by law to file publicly available accounts.
The balance sheets and profit and loss accounts were obtained for all years since
buy-out to 1991 or up to receivership and yielded 251 buy-outs. A matched sample
of 446 non-buy-outs was also drawn from publicly available databases to enable
performance comparisons to be made. The data for non-buy-outs were selected on
the basis of matching criteria relating to size and industry firom a publicly available
database of privately-held companies (FAME). Drawing on previous studies of the
financial performance of buy-outs and on standard ratios typically used to assess
the profitability, labor productivity and liquidity of firms variables were selected
relating to return on equity, return on assets, profits per employee, two measures of
short term liquidity (current and quick asset ratios) and a measure of long term
liquidity ( net worth/total assets). As an alternative to the net worth/total assets
ratio, the standard gearing ratio was used (borrowings plus preference stock/
equity) but this was found to perform less well, being distorted in some years by
the effects of negative reserves arising from post-tax losses being transferred to
profit and loss account reserves. A similar problem also arose with the use of the
income gearing ratio, EBIT/interest, and which was therefore dropped from the
reported results. The analysis of efficiency presented below utilized added value,
gross fixed assets and employment as variables measuring output, capital stock
and labor inputs.
The standard way to test for productivity effects is to estimate a multivariate
equation which includes a variable controlling for firm type (i.e., buy-out or non
buy-out) in an appropriately specified production function. The productivity aug
mentation is hypothesized to be disembodied in the inputs. If we denote real output
by X, then this will be affected by the levels and quality of capital stock (K), labor
input (L) and may vary by industry (IND). The inclusion of a dummy variable rep
resenting the existence or not of a buy-out (MBO) gives an augmented production
function of the general form:
35
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X = X(L,K,IND,MBO)

(1 )

The productivity effects of the buy-out can be tested via the sign, significance and
size of the coefficients on the MBO variable. In contrast to univariate ratio analysis
this approach models productivity in the context of labor and capital inputs and
controls for industry specific differences in productive efficiency. The buy-out
dummy tests for broad differences in efficiency that are due to the change in own
ership. Thus a production function provides a way to describe the relationship
between inputs and outputs, but is not behavioral. Theory therefore offers us few
insights into the appropriate specification and functional form. However, misspecification can be a serious issue since the methodology involves relating the
existence of a buy-out to the residual of output not explained by factor inputs. The
early literature addressed this problem by testing between a wide variety of alter
native production function forms, including Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity of
Substimtion and Translog functions. In general Cobb-Douglas forms tended to
predominate, though often with both embodied and disembodied varieties of pro
ductivity enhancement (see Jones & Kato 1995 for a study which investigates the
productivity impact of ESOPs).
In order to explore this issue regression analysis was used to examine the fol
lowing relationship between capital stock, total labor input and ou^ut, measured
as value added, for each year post-buy-out for a period of six years:

(2)
which in log-linear form becomes:
LVA = a + b(UQ + bl (LL) + h i (MBO) + b3....bn (IND) + u

(3)

where: LVA is the log of value added, LK is the log of capital resource defined as
gross fixed assets, LL is the log of employment, MBO is a dummy taking the value
1 if the enterprise is a buy-out, IND is a set of industry dummies, and u is the error
term.
In line with expectations noted earlier, management owned a majority of the
equity in the majority of buy-outs surveyed. In 77.3 percent of cases incumbent
management held more than half of the equity and in 16 percent of cases they held
all of it. The buy-outs were overwhelmingly modest in size, with 95 percent having
a transaction value of £5 million (approx. $10 million) or less. Almost three quar
ters were divisional buy-outs, a further 1 1 percent involved succession in privately-owned firms and the balance were buyouts from receivership or from the
public sector. There were no going private buy-outs in this period in the UK.
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Table 2
Share of UK Management Buy-outs Funded by Venture Capitalists
Based on Data Relating to All Buy-outs Completed in a Particular
Year 1989-1994
Size Range
(Transaction Value, £m)

1989
(%)

1990
(%)

1991
(%)

1992
(%)

1993
(%)

1994
(%)

Less than 1
1-5
5-10
Over 10

61.3
48.0
74.4
84.2

41.2
38.8
75.6

38.8
40.6
56.0
77.8

46.2
32.0
59.1
93.3

20.2
28.9
88.9
85.4

40.4
35.5
83.9
87.5

Source:

11.\

CMBOR

IV. RESULTS
Longevity
The authors’ monitoring through the CMBOR database shows that venture
capitalists play an important role in buy-out markets (Table 2). However, not all
buy-outs are funded with the aid of venture capitalists. Rather, many, especially
smaller ones, are funded by straightforward bank debt. As seen in the earlier liter
ature review, this raises issues concerning the relative longevity of buy-outs
funded from these two sources. The first sample of 158 buy-outs identified in the
previous section are used in this section to compare the longevity of venture
backed and non-venture backed buy-outs. The authors’ monitoring of buy-out
exits shows marked differences in the longevity of the buy-outs financed from
these different sources. The overall sample of buy-outs completed in 1983-85 as
described in the methodology section were divided into 1 1 1 which had originally
received venture backing (Table 3) and 45 which had not, being primarily funded
by bank debt (Table 4).
In line with expectations, venture backed buy-outs tend to exit sooner and to a
greater extent than those which have not received support from venture capitalists.
After three years, 18 percent of venture-backed cases had exited by trade sale or
IPO compared with only 2 percent of other buy-outs. By year five after buy-out,
the comparable figures were 30.6 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively. There are
indications that those venture backed deals which will fail do so sooner than is the
case for non-venture backed cases, but that the latter’s failure rate overtakes that of
the former by year 8 . By year 10 after buy-out, 46 percent of venture backed buy
outs had exited through trade sale or IPO and a further tenth had entered receiver
ship. In contrast, only a tenth of non-venture backed deals had exited by trade sale
or IPO and almost a sixth had failed.
There appears to be a significant minority of buy-out entrepreneurs who see
their firms as becoming privately-held businesses for an indefinite period of time.
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Table 3
Cumulative Exit Status By Year Post-Buy-out and Type of Exit of 111
Venture-Backed Management Buy-outs Completed in the Period 1983-85
up to December 1995
Total sample
AgeofM BO
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Y ears
Year 6
Year?
Y ears
Year 9
Year 10

No exit

Exit^

Receivership

No

%

No

%

No

%

No

%

111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

110
103
90
83
72
62
57
54
49
48

99.1
92.8
81.1
74.8
64.9
55.9
51.4
48.6
44.7
43.2

1
7
20
27
34
41
44
46
50
51

0.9
7.2
18.0
24.3
30.6
36.9
39.6
41.5
45.0
46.0

0
0
1
2
5
8
10
11
12
12

0
0
0.9
1.8
4.5
7.2
9.0
9.9
10.8
10.8

Note: 1. By way of IPO, trade sale or management buy-out/buy-in

Table 4
Cumulative Exit Status By Year Post-Buy-out and Type of Exit of 45
Management Buy-outs Completed in the Period 1983-85 up to December 1995
Total sample
Age ofMBO
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10

No exit

Exit^

Receivership

No

%

No

%

No

%

No

%

45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

45
45
44
41
39
35
34
31
30
29

100.
100.
97.8
91.1
86.7
77.8
75.6
68.9
66.7
64.4

0
0
1
4
6
7
7
8
9
9

0.0
0.0
2.2
8.9
13.3
15.6
15.6
17.8
20.0
20.0

0
0
0
0
0
3
4
6
6
7

0
0
0
0
0
6.7
8.9
13.3
13.3
15.6

Note: 1. By way of IPO, trade sale or management buy-out/buy-in

Of the 35 non-exited buy-outs re-surveyed in 1996, 17 (48.6 per cent) had origi
nally identified no specific method of exit. Ten years later, seven firms still had no
specific exit method in mind, though a further nine were considering exit through
retirement with a retained equity participation, seven expected to exit through fam
ily succession and six through a secondary buy-out by other managers. It should be
noted, however, that only 20 percent of this sample of 35 companies had bought
back any ordinary stock but that almost all (96.2 percent) of those with preference
stock in the initial financial structure had redeemed either all ( 1 1 firms) or some
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(14 firms) of them, thus enabling non-bank financiers to achieve some form of
exit.
Strategic Reorganization
As noted above, the results in this section are drawn from the authors’ followup survey of 35 buy-outs which had been surveyed 10 years previously. Three
principal issues were examined, the factors influencing strategic direction, the
direction of influence of extemal and internal factors on profitability and changes
in insider and outsider directors.
Managers in these buy-outs were first asked to score the importance of a range
of sources of growth identified at the time of the buy-out and also to score their
actual importance in retrospect (Table 5). There was little change in the ranking of
the factors between the time of the buy-out and the time of the second survey,
though in general most elements received greater scores in retrospect. In contrast
to the view sometimes expressed that buy-outs are principally about cost rational
ization in mature markets, the three most important influences related to market
factors, especially increases in the customer base, new markets and product devel
opment. The importance of product development over this longer period is consis
tent with findings in other studies (Wright, et al., 1992; Zahra, 1995) of product
innovation in buy-outs in the short term. Introduction of new product technology
did, however, receive a relatively low score, although in retrospect there were
some indications that it had been more influential than originally anticipated.
Over one-half (51.4 per cent) of the sample had made at least one acquisition
in the ten years or more since the buy-out. Strategic fit was generally considered to
Table 5
Managements’ Perceptions of Strategic Influence on Performance at
Time of Buy-out and Over Ten Year Period Post Buy-out (Mean Score)
Strategic Influence

On Buy-out

Ten Years On

Increased customer base
New Markets
Product Development
Rationalization of Operating Costs
Rationalization of Fixed Costs
New Capital Investment
Rationalization of Products
Introduction of New Product Technology
Acquisitions
Strategic Alliances

3.80
3.79
3.36
3.31
3.12
2.83
2.37
2.17
1.85
1.70

3.97
3.97
3.50
3.31
3.26
2.82
2.82
2.41
2.21
2.03

Note: Results based on scores for each item ranging from l=highly unimportant to 5=highly
important.
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Table 6
External Influences on Operating Profltability
in the Long Term
Influence
Customer relations
Pricing
Competitors
Marketing
Product considerations
Product market
Economic climate
Interest rates
Location
Exchange rates
Financial markets
Note:

Mean Score
4.06
3.69
3.55
3.47
3.24
3.12
3.11
2.97
2.97
2.94
2.63

Scores based on range l=highly negative effect on operating
profitability through 5=highly positive.

be good (mean score of 4 on a range from 1 to 5 where 5=strongly agree with the
statement) and there was some evidence of good knowledge of the target (mean
score 3.38). However, in about two-fifths of cases there was evidence of problems
with respect to the amount of management time consumed on the acquisition and
its drain on cash.
The outcomes of strategic actions were examined by asking questions con
cerning the external and internal influences on operating profitability. The strate
gic importance attached to extending the customer base is reflected in the emphasis
placed on customer relations as an external influence on profitability (Table 6).
Other market factors such as pricing, competitors and marketing all received
strong scores. General financial conditions were of lesser importance, with product
related issues being scored somewhat more positively.
The most important internal influences on operating profitability over the long
term related to control factors and human resource issues. Administrative cost con
trol and accounting and other control systems were ranked first and third in impor
tance (Table 7), while employee relations and management team relationships
were ranked second and fourth, respectively. Although product development
ranked highly as a strategic factor, as seen above, it ranked low as an internal influ
ence on profitability, as did capital expenditure.
Over the long term it may be expected that extensive changes will occur in the
board membership of bought out companies. In twenty three (almost two thirds) of
the companies, there had been new appointments of executive directors to the
board since the time of the first survey. There were multiple reasons for these
appointments, but in twelve cases this was the result of the retirement of an incum
bent, in eight cases it was in order to hire specialist skills and in only three cases
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Table 7
Internal Influences on Operating
Profitability in the Long Term
Mean Score

Influence

3.86
3.80
3.74
3.68
3.50
3.44
3.41
3.29
3.18
3.06
3.06

Employee Relations
Administt'ative Cost Control
Accounting and other control systems
Team relationships
Cash flow
Inventory control
Production efficiency
Facilities/equipment
Product development
Capital structure
Capital expenditure
Note:

Scores based on range l=highly negative effect on operating profit
ability through 5=highly positive.

Table 8
UK - Post Buy-out Performance Compared to Non Buy-outs; Comparison of
Mean Performance Ratios and Statistically Significant Differences
Return on Total Assets
Return on Equity
Profit/Employee
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Net Worth/Total Assets

t+6

t+5

0.039
0.058
0.165
0.120
1327
2150*
1.43
1.56
0.93
1.08
0.299
0.339

0.033
0.064**
0.069
0.305*
1229
2204*
1.76
1.35
1.25
0.87
0.298
0.325

t +4

t+3

t+2

t+ 1

00.051
0.086*
-1.02
0.41*
2804
4979
1.34
1.59*
0.92
1.01
0.345
0.391

0.051
0.087*
-0.37
-0.09
997
3127**
1.60
2.44
1.07
1.78
0.39
0.36

0.044
0.052
0.008
0.982
1016
2704
3.91
1.41
3.34
0.97
0.39
0.27*

0.005
0.015
0.76
0.30
348
81
1.35
1.07

o .n
0.73
0.338
0.076

Notes: Significance levels = * 5% **1%.
First figure in each row is mean for non-buy-outs, second figure is mean for buy-outs.

was it because of poor performance of an incumbent. Within a period of up to three
years after buy-out, the first survey showed that there had been changes in the buy
out team in 19 per cent of cases (Wright, et al., 1992). In fourteen of the buy-outs
there had been changes in the composition of the non-executive (outsider) director
membership of the board, seven companies introducing a non-executive director
for the first time.
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Financial Performance Changes
The results in this section are based on the second sample of 251 buy-outs iden
tified above, with data from 446 non-buy-outs being used for comparison purposes.
Post buy-out performance was tracked for up to six years after the transaction. The
results are shown in Table 8, where means of a range of performance variables for
buy-outs and non-buy-outs are reported. Tests were carried out to identify those
differences in the mean performance ratios for the buy-out and non-buy-out sub
samples that could be deemed statistically significant. The test takes into account
the variances associated with each mean value when evaluating the differences.
In the early years post buy-out, no significant differences in the return on total
assets ratio are identified. This ratio is preferred as a measure of performance over
the return on equity ratio as the latter may be distorted by the influence of negative
reserves, especially in the short term. The return on total assets ratio is on average
greater for buy-outs than non-buy-outs in the first two years, though not signifi
cantly so. These findings are consistent with the notion that buy-outs frequently
involve underperforming businesses, both in relation to their potential and in rela
tion to their industries. Although, as seen earlier, actions are taken on buy-out
which lead to improved performance, it may take some time before this signifi
cantly exceeds the average for the sector. A similar pattern is observed in respect
of labor productivity as measured by the profit to employee figures.
Over years 3 to 5 post buy-out, there are indications that buy-outs on average
perform significantly better than comparable non-buy-outs on both the return on
total assets and profit to employee measures. In our sample, this period relates to
the late 1980s. In the sixth year after buy-out, the significantly greater performance
of buy-outs begins to disappear.
Fewer significant differences are apparent in respect of the short term liquidity
ratios and generally speaking both groups on average display acceptable levels of
liquidity according to conventional levels. There are suggestions that buy-outs in
their first two years have lower liquidity ratios than non-buy-outs, but that thereaf
ter apart from year 5 they have superior ratios. This pattern may be consistent with
the impact of tighter working capital control systems.
A similar pattern is observed in respect of net worth to total assets ratios as a
measure of leverage. As expected, buy-outs initially have lower ratios than their
non-buy-out matched counterparts, but over the longer period the relative posi
tions are reversed.
Efficiency Changes
As in the previous section, the results below are based on the second sample of
buy-outs identified earlier. The sample of non-buy-outs is used in order to analyze

ENTREPRENEURIAL A N D SM ALL BU SIN ESS H N A N C E

230

5(3) 1996

Table 9
Efficiency of Buy-outs and Non-Buy-outs: Cobb-Douglas Production
Function Estimates
Variables
LogEmployment
(LL)
LogCapital (LK)
Buy-out (MBO)
Industry dummies
(IND)
CONSTANT
r2
F
Sig.

t+6

t+5

t+4

t+3

t+2

t+l

0.69***

0.70***

0.74***

0.64***

0.68***

0.96***

0.26***
0.002
yes

0.26***
0.21***
yes

0.21***
0.11*
yes

0.29***
0.16**
yes

0.13*
0.07*
yes

0.09
0.05
yes

7.56***
0.81

y 24***

783***

0.85

0.86

7 27***
0.96

8.56***
0.94

7.68***
0.92

154.4
0.000

140.9
0.000

133.1
0.000

18.1
0.01

17.1
0.01

lA
0.01

Note: Figures in brackets are t statistics

the effect of a buy-out per se on efficiency changes. The comparative productivity
performance of buy-outs versus non-buy-outs was assessed in terms of the effi
ciency in which they combine factor inputs (labor and capital) to produce outputs
using the methodology described earlier. The results of the analysis are shown in
Table 9. The analysis is carried out on surviving buy-outs and non-buy-outs over
the relevant post-buy-out period. Thus six separate equations are estimated. A pos
itive and significant sign on the variable MBO in the equation would indicate supe
rior productive efficiency in the buy-out sub-sample, cet par, in that year. Our
earlier deliberations, however, suggest that the productivity effects of buy-outs
may not be immediate. For instance, a buy-out may not result in an inmiediate
alignment of the goals of various groups of employees party to the buy-out or
result in increased co-operation and better working practices from day one.
The basic production function appears well specified, with more or less con
stant returns to scale (the coefficients on LL and LK, b + bl, approx. = 1), in all
years with the exception of t+l and ?+2. Each of the equations is deemed statisti
cally significant according to the
and F-tests at 1% or better. The
values
indicate that the equations are explaining up to 96% of the total variations in output
in the sample. The t+\, and to some extent ?+2, results are likely to be affected by
noise in the accounting data post buy-out or by the effects of immediate re-organ
isation of production and working practices. Thus, the coefficients for the first
buy-out year are not significant suggesting that bought out companies undergo
some initial period before the impact of the increased incentives and control mech
anisms begin to be felt. This is consistent with the point made by Jones and Kato
(1995) in respect of the timing of the initial benefits from ESOPs. A small but sig
nificant productivity effect of the buy-out is observed in year t+2 which increases
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to approximately a 20% productivity differential by year t+5. On average for the
six years of comparison the buy-out sub-sample is exhibiting a 9% productivity
differential over the non-buy-out control sample.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has examined the longer term effects of management buy-outs using
two representative samples and a combination of financial and non-financial infor
mation.
Evidence relating to the longevity of buy-outs suggests that even ten years
after the transaction approaching half remain as buy-outs. However, it is clear that
buy-outs receiving support from venmre capitalists exit at a considerably greater
rate and sooner than non-venture backed deals. Reflecting expectations that ven
ture capitalists are likely to invest in riskier ventures than providers of debt, ven
ture backed exits are more likely to be both successful (i.e., stock market flotation)
and unsuccessful (i.e., receivership). Indeed, returns on buy-out investments are
the highest of any type of venture capital investment in the UK (BVCA, 1996).
Buy-outs which remain as such for periods of at least ten years were found to
experience extensive changes in their senior management team. They are also
found to engage in significant product development and market-based strategic
actions, but the greatest positive impact on operating profitability is considered to
derive from enhanced control of costs, enhanced control systems and from human
resource management factors.
In support of earlier studies, there is evidence that buy-outs display raw short
term improvements in financial performance. There are also indications that buy
outs on average significantly outperform their industrial sectors for around five
years after the transaction. This period is longer than previously suggested by other
studies. Analysis of changes in efficiency also provides evidence that buy-outs are
significantly more successful than non-buy-outs over a similar period post-buy
out.
The above findings suggest a number of implications for practitioners. Suc
cessful buy-outs may require both innovations as well as restructuring of cost
bases and control systems. Even apparently stable product sectors, the classic buy
out situation, may eventually have limited life-cycles and require new product
development if the buy-out is to succeed in the longer term.
The evidence of the existence of superior longer term performance by buy
outs suggests that venture capitalists may need to consider their investment per
spectives carefully, particularly in respect of exit versus second-round investment.
For financiers it is clear that the buy-out concept can be successfully applied to
growth as well as restructuring cases. This point raises the importance of appropri
ate financial structuring and entrepreneurial screening and matching to the circum-
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stances of a particular transaction. Nevertheless, there are indications of a need to
take a life-cycle perspective of buy-outs in order to meet the demands of entrepre
neurs’ career aspirations, market contingencies and investor requirements for real
ization of returns.
Further research may usefully be directed at a number of areas. First, the anal
ysis has focused solely on management buy-outs, that is those transactions which
involve incumbent managers. As is becoming recognized, the generic buy-out con
cept involves a variety of forms. The management buy-in, involving external man
agers raises adverse selection issues which may have important implications for
entrepreneurs’ ability to effect efficiency improvements. This also has implica
tions for their longevity, with there already being evidence that they are subject to
significantly higher failure rates (Robbie & Wright, 1996). There would appear to
be scope for comparative studies of the longer term impact of management buy-ins
and buy-outs.
In analyzing longer-term profitability and efficiency, there would appear to be
scope for examination of differences in these aspects of firm behavior in respect to
larger and small buy-outs, the influences of managerial equity stakes and other ele
ments of corporate governance and the impact of the original source of the trans
action. There is also scope for further exploration of the changes in efficiency post
buy-out.
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